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Rent Management – The Heart of Green Industrial Policy 
 






At the heart of green industrial policy is rent management: government creating and 
withdrawing opportunities for highly profitable investment. This paper asks what the key 
factors are for rent management to succeed. Drawing on a range of literatures the paper first 
deals with the critical success factors for ‘normal’ rent management and then turns to one of 
the most pressing and controversial issues of our time: how to bring about the transition to 
renewable energy. This is extra challenging because technological uncertainties are high, 
time horizons for investment are long, yet action is required now. The paper suggests that 
responding to these challenges requires above all a political approach to rent management. 
The critical success factors for managing such policy rents are those that enable it to mitigate 
four risks: political capture by private investors and allied policy makers; choosing the wrong 
instruments; targeting the wrong sectors or technologies; and doing too little. The paper 
concludes that a public-private-civic alliance is needed to deal with the most fundamental risk 
of governments doing too little and not achieving the scaling up of green investment.  
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1 Introduction 
There is increasing agreement that mitigating climate change requires intervention by the 
state. There is, however, no agreement on how best to intervene. What is the most promising 
approach? Under what political conditions can it work? How can these conditions be 
enhanced? What capabilities – within government and outside government - are needed to 
make it work? Which instruments are most appropriate? How big an intervention is needed to 
correct the market failure? How long should the policy be in operation? These are the policy 
questions which arise at the national level.1  
The search for answers to these questions needs take account of several risks: doing too 
little would mean that we reach a tipping point2 beyond which damage to the global 
ecosystem becomes irreversible. Doing too much would mean moving in the right direction 
but in a wasteful way. Doing the wrong things can harm rather than further progress. Getting 
it right is not about technical optimisation but about political management under great 
uncertainty. This paper seeks to identify the key factors which help it to succeed.  
Let us specify our objective more precisely. This paper is a contribution to the debate on 
green industrial policy which we define as ‘government intervention which brings about 
economic restructuring without overstretching the carrying capacity of the global ecosystem’. 
We are particularly concerned with our planet’s capacity to cope with carbon emissions since 
these induce climate chaos. We can therefore – for the purpose of this paper – adopt a 
narrower definition of green industrial policy, namely ‘government-induced restructuring 
towards a low carbon economy’.’3  
While many issues in the debate on such green industrial policy are contested, there is 
agreement on two things: first, reducing reliance on fossil fuels and increasing the role of 
renewable energy is central to reducing carbon emissions and mitigating climate change. 
Second, attracting private investment to the development and deployment of renewable 
energy technologies4 is essential for achieving this. Government can do this by providing 
(and withdrawing) opportunities for above-average profits on investment. We call this rent 
management, following Khan (2008). This rent management is always a challenging task and 
it is particularly challenging when it comes to decarbonisation: the uncertainties are high and 
the time horizons are long, yet investments need to be made now. This is the first big 
transition in history that has a deadline.  
The aim of this paper is to help understand rent management – both in general when aimed 
at industrial restructuring and specifically when aimed at fostering renewables. As will 
become apparent in the course of this paper, there is no golden path or silver bullet, but 
there are concepts and tools which help to identify disabling and enabling factors for good 
rent management. Identifying these is important for policy learning and experimentation 
which – as we shall argue – are important for the transition to renewable energy. In pursuing 
our objectives, we will draw in particular on the literature concerned with managing and 
seeking rents. For further inspiration, we draw on other literature, in particular works 
concerned with state-business relations, industrial policy and policy experimentation, and 
bring in lessons from recent studies of the green transformation and sustainability oriented 
innovation systems.  
                                               
1  For a discussion of policy challenges at the global level, see Bulkeley and Newell (2010). 
2  For a discussion of tipping points in the green transformation, see WGBU (2011).  
3  A similar definition is used by Karp and Stevenson (2012): ‘government attempts to hasten the development of low-
carbon alternatives to fossil fuels’.  
4  For the sake of brevity, the remainder of the paper will refer to this as ‘fostering renewables’.  
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The question which drives this paper is what are the critical success factors for green rent 
management. Identifying such factors in government is essential but not sufficient; we also 
look for success factors outside government. Success means pushing up private green 
investment in an effective and efficient way. This paper does not, however, focus on 
measuring the outcome (notoriously difficult because of the missing counterfactual) but on 
getting the process of restructuring underway and triggering a self-reinforcing dynamic.  
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 prepares the ground by providing a definition 
and typology of rents and making clear that this paper is about policy rents. The substantial 
discussion begins with Section 3; it puts government in the driving seat and squeezes those 
elements out of the rent management literature which are useful for our purpose. The basic 
idea of this literature is simple: in order to bring about economic transformation government 
needs to direct private investment into new sectors. This is done by offering investors the 
possibility of above average profits. It involves creating and allocating rents among different 
actors. The capabilities required for effective rent management are discussed in this section. 
Subsequent sections then draw on other strands of research to complement the insights 
gained from the literature on rent management.  
One of the big challenges for rent management is that the target group, the private investors, 
do not necessarily ‘follow the script’, for example, putting more effort into obtaining incentives 
than developing or deploying the new technology. Such problems have been discussed at 
length in the rent seeking (and principal-agent) literature. Section 4 distils those insights from 
the rent seeking literature which can help to make rent management more effective. There is 
a deliberate tension between Sections 3 and 4: the rent management literature starts from 
the position that rents need to be created in order to channel investments into desirable 
sectors and is concerned with the conditions to make this happen. In contrast, the rent 
seeking literature emphasises the risk of perverse incentives and political capture and 
therefore argues that rent regimes should be avoided. At the risk of oversimplification, one 
could say that the rent management literature starts from the assumption that rent is a good 
thing and that the challenge is to manage it well. In contrast the rent seeking literature starts 
from the assumption that rent is a bad thing and that rent needs to be minimised if not 
eliminated. Working through this tension helps us to identify critical success factors but it is 
not sufficient.  
There are three dimensions which remain underdeveloped in the literature on managing and 
seeking rents and which need explicit consideration. These three dimensions are interrelated 
but will be discussed one by one.  
• Alignment of interests: we need to take into account not only the interests of the private 
investors but also the interests of the political leaders and policy makers. This is why 
Section 5 draws on the state-business literature and identifies concepts which capture 
different kinds of interests and alliances and the political conditions for transformational 
outcomes. These conditions lie partly within and partly outside government.  
• Policy learning and experimentation: governments seeking to accelerate the transition to 
renewable energy cannot follow tested pathways but they are under pressure to act now. 
This is why Section 6 explores insights which the policy experimentation literature 
provides. 
• Long time horizons and great uncertainties: fostering renewables requires mobilising 
enormous investments with long time horizons, channelling these investments into 
pathways that are often poorly defined, yet seeking to accelerate the process because of 
looming deadlines. Section 7 therefore asks how green rent management differs from 
‘normal’ rent management and what extra requirements are needed to make it work. To 
this end it draws on recent work concerned with fostering the green transformation and 
building sustainability oriented innovation systems. 
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The final Section 8 draws together the key factors which contribute to successful green rent 
management. It groups the risks and challenges and then identifies how these can be 
overcome. The paper finishes with questions for future research.  
 
2 Defining rents and rent management 
There is no agreed definition, nor is there an agreed typology of rents. The conceptual steps 
we take in this paper are as follows: 
1. We define rents as above average profits. 
2. We distinguish between three types of rent: 
• Rents made possible by nature: this includes Ricardo’s ground rent and more 
generally rents derived from mining natural resources.  
• Rents made possible by private enterprises creating and taking advantage of barriers 
to entry. The most famous example is Schumpeter’s innovation rent. Intellectual 
property rights are a way of prolonging and protecting this rent. But there other ways 
in which firms create temporary barriers to entry and earn rents – see for example 
Kaplinsky’s (2005) list of nine rents.  
• Rents made possible by public policy. The best known example is trade policy rent, 
made possible by government imposing tariffs on foreign imports or providing 
subsidies for national producers.  
In this paper we are concerned with the last category, namely rents made possible by 
government intervention. We will refer to them as ‘policy rents’ and define them as risk-
adjusted5 above average profits6 made possible by government intervention. Continuing with 
our conceptual steps we can define rent management as government intervention for raising 
(lowering) profitability in selected sectors and thus making private investment in these 
sectors more (less) attractive.7 In this paper rent management refers to the way governments 
create or withdraw policy rents and how they influence their allocation among different actors 
and for different purposes.  
Neither the above definitions nor typology appear in the rent management literature but they 
are entirely in the spirit of that literature. The next section extracts those elements of this 
literature which might be useful for our purpose of how to bring about the transition from 
fossil fuels to renewable energies. 
 
                                               
5  Since high risk investments can expect higher profits than low-risk investments, we have included ‘risk-adjusted’ in the 
definition.  
6  Determining the average rate of profit is difficult but this is an empirical not a conceptual issue. The empirical problem 
arises from the fact that profit expectations vary. Similarly, risk perceptions vary a great deal.  
7  In other words, rent management is incentives management. 
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3 Managing rents 
The inspiration for this paper comes from the small literature on rent management (Medema 
1991; Khan 2008; Khan and Blankenburg 2009). We give particular attention to the work of 
Mushtaq Khan because his central concerns are the same as ours. He seeks to understand 
economic transformation and the role of government in bringing it about. The analytical 
issues are the same, even though we are concerned with the contemporary green 
transformation while Khan goes back in time analysing the transformation of developing 
countries from low productivity pre-capitalist to higher productivity capitalist ones (Khan 
2008: 126).  
Khan asks what kind of governance capabilities enabled developing countries to make this 
transformation. His main argument is that the transformation was not achieved by relying on 
market enhancing governance as advocated in the good governance and investment climate 
debate. Although he is not against this horizontal approach aimed at making markets more 
efficient and reducing transaction costs for all enterprises, he argues that it provides at best 
second order conditions. Instead, what we call a vertical approach is needed, providing 
incentives for investment in specific new sectors. To do this, government needs capabilities 
to increase profitability in new sectors and decrease profitability in old sectors. This kind of 
capability – Khan argues – has been essential for the earlier transition to capitalism and for 
the more recent economic transformation which enabled Asian developing countries to 
compete in the global economy. In a nutshell, fostering economic growth and transformation 
requires government acquiring and using rent management capabilities.  
Our most important lessons from the rent management literature are as follows: first, the 
challenge is not to avoid rents but to manage them; second, the capabilities required for 
managing rents need attention; third, capable governments can use a range of instruments; 
fourth, identifying the political conditions for successful rent management is important – but 
needs help from other strands of literature.  
These points can be derived from Khan’s review of the experience of developing countries in 
the second half of the twentieth century. He observes that economic transformation was an 
ambition of many countries.  
Successes and failures … can be related to the match or mismatch of the 
requirements of the economic strategy being followed and the governance 
capabilities that were required for effectively implementing it. 
(Khan, 2008: 111) 
Capabilities to carry out market-enhancing policies (such as investment climate reform) were 
not enough. Rent management capabilities were necessary. This is an important conclusion 
in view of the insistence of some international (and national) development agencies that 
developing countries should limit themselves to reforming their investment climate and that 
more efficiently working markets would then bring about the required transformation.  
Khan concludes from his historical review that the Asian governments with the requisite rent 
management capabilities have used very different instruments.  
Opportunities were created using many different mechanisms including tariff 
protection (in virtually every case but to varying extent), direct subsidies (in particular 
in South Korea), subsidized and prioritized infrastructure for priority sectors (in China 
and Malaysia), and subsidizing the licensing of advanced foreign technologies (in 
Taiwan). With the advent of a new consensus on international trade through the 
WTO, tariff protection is no longer an option for most developing countries, but 
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historical experience tells us that this is not the only way, or even the most effective 
way in which to organize support for the learning processes …. 
(Khan 2008: 134). 
Implicitly Khan argues that searching for the best instrument (best in all circumstances) is 
futile, again an important point to consider for the debate on fostering renewables.  
While emphasising the variety of instruments, there is a common capability requirement for 
rent management. ‘… states had the institutional and political capacity to ensure that non-
performance was not tolerated for too long. … The common feature of success was that 
failure led to corrective action’ (Khan 2008: 134-5). 
This emphasis on the capability requirements of rent management is reinforced by the 
warning that ‘badly managed rents can mean permanently poor resource allocation as well 
as high rent-seeking costs’ (Khan 2008: 135). ‘…potentially growth-enhancing rents can 
become growth reducing if the rent-management capacities of the state are missing (Khan 
and Blankenburg 2009: 348). The rent management literature tells us, however, little about 
how these capabilities are acquired. While concerned with fostering learning in the private 
sector, it ignores the issue of learning in government. This is why we examine later - in 
section 6 - what can be extracted from the literature on policy learning and experimentation 
that is useful for our purposes.  
The rent management literature does, however, draw attention to the political conditions 
needed for effective rent management. Managing rents ‘is not just constrained by state 
capacities, but also and often primarily by political constraints that prevent specific strategies 
of rent management from being implemented’ (Khan and Blankenburg 2009: 348). The 
authors emphasise that the successful rent managers have emerged in different political 
circumstances. ‘While their internal political configurations were different, each of these 
configurations allowed the effective implementation of different and quite specific strategies 
of rent management’ (Khan and Blankenburg 2009: 348). This lesson was derived from a 
review of Latin American and Asian experiences. The conclusion that the enabling political 
configurations varied a great deal is important in itself but it begs the question of whether 
there were common elements and whether the key political elements for successful rent 
management can be specified. The rent management literature itself does not provide these. 
Therefore section 5 will turn to the state business relations literature and seek support from 
there.  
Specifying the political conditions for successful rent management is particularly important 
because the provision of rents can be (and often is) abused by the private sector. This 
danger is dealt with at great length in the literature on rent seeking enterprises. The next 
section distils what public rent managers can learn from this literature.  
 
4  Seeking rents 
Managing rents effectively requires understanding the interests and objectives of actors who 
seek to obtain those rents. The rent seeking literature helps to bring these out. In fact 
enormous attention has been given by economists and political scientists to rent seeking and 
the harm it does to the economy and polity (Congleton et al. 2008; Tullock 2005). For the 
purpose of this paper it suffices to bring out two key points:  
• Chasing the investment incentives becomes the main entrepreneurial activity rather than 
competing by making better products or adopting better processes. The offer or 
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possibility of policy rents pulls entrepreneurs into unproductive activities. This was 
Krueger’s (1974) main argument in an article which triggered the rent seeking debate.  
• Groups of entrepreneurs ‘capture’ government such that their interests are prioritised 
over the interests of others in the rent allocation process. As a result incentives are given 
for the wrong things or they are too high for the right things. Such political capture by 
business of the policy process is difficult to reverse. 
Some authors have used a principal-agent framework in order to work through such 
problems and finds ways of addressing them (Tollinson 1982). The rent producing ‘principal’ 
delegates responsibility for achieving a particular goal to a rent seeking ‘agent’. Problems 
arise because principals and agents naturally have conflicting interests and the principal can 
never fully know what the agent is doing. As a result, the agents will only pursue the 
principal’s interests if they have an incentive to do so and the principal can only confirm this 
by monitoring their agent. Monitoring schemes and the creation of incentive structures come 
at a price. It is in the interests of the agent to influence the priorities and knowledge of the 
principal through the strategic use of information (and disinformation) and manipulate the 
way a particular issue is framed in the policy process. Meanwhile, the principal will have to 
spend resources to obtain a variety of knowledge upon which to base decisions about the 
optimal level of rents. For example, in the case of subsidising deployment of renewable 
energy policy, governments try to set rents at a level that will ensure the desired level of 
investments into renewable energy projects. Determining this level is a complex task; it 
requires making a judgement of scientists’ predictions, consumer preferences and investors’ 
cost data.  
Striking a balance between costs and benefits is a challenge and offers many opportunities 
for rent seeking agents to influence the allocation of rent (Hepburn 2010: 127-28). The 
implication for the rent managers (principals) is that they need to invest in obtaining 
independent information to monitor the agents and assess competing claims. This need for 
monitoring the agents (rent seekers) is directly relevant for our central concern: identifying 
the critical success factors for rent management.  
Organising this monitoring is costly but it can be done and often needs to be done. But it 
would not be an adequate response if the relationship between government (principals) and 
investors (agents) has become too close and the government is in the investors’ pocket. This 
is the problem of political capture. The rent -literature helps us to recognise this problem and 
its severity but it does not offer a way out. It merely suggests that rents should not be created 
to start with. In this way the problems arising from rent seeking would be avoided.  
There are two problems with this position: first it fails to recognise that rents are ubiquitous. 
The energy sector is a perfect example. Avoiding the creation of rents for producing 
renewable energy would not take us into a rent free world. On the contrary, the evolution of 
the fossil fuel industry is riddled with creation and allocation of rents … and with political 
capture.  
Second, rents are not necessarily harmful. They can be a strategic transformational 
resource. If government wants to enlist the private sector in restructuring the economy, rent 
management is an unavoidable task. This is why we ask what other bodies of literature offer 
in terms of critical success factors for rent management. To this end, the next two sections 
screen the state-business literature and the literature on policy learning and experimentation.  
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5 State-business relations 
The purpose of this section is to specify what kind of state-business relations are conducive 
to successful rent management. It identifies the main propositions in the state-business 
literature relevant for our concerns. 
There is now widespread agreement that conducting industrial policy requires ‘embedded 
autonomy’ (Evans 1995). In other words, government needs to work with the private sector 
but must avoid capture by the private sector. The Weberian ideal of a civil service detached 
from business is unlikely to work; civil servants do not have the expertise and up to date 
knowledge for designing and implementing industrial policy. This view is expressed by Rodrik 
(2007), Abdel-Latif and Schmitz (2010), Altenburg (2011) and many others.  
If active cooperation between government and business is so critical, we need to ask what 
interests would bring them together. On both the private and public sector side we need to 
distinguish between short term and long term interests. The short term interests of the private 
sector are discussed in the rent seeking literature8 but the long term interests receive little 
attention. They are however well known: some entrepreneurs take the long view and incur 
high short term costs (investing in new technologies) in order to position themselves for the 
future.  
On the public sector side, the distinction between short term and long term interests is 
equally important – as stressed by Olson (1993). There are politicians/policy makers who 
seek immediate benefits (personal enrichment by providing favours; improving their 
prospects at the next election) and those who seek benefit in the long term (gain from growth 
of the economy or the sector over several years).9 Where both private and public actors are 
driven by the long term interests, one would have an ideal constellation for successful rent 
management. However, turning this into a necessary condition would be too restrictive and 
prevent us from looking for second best solutions.  
The real world is messy and public office is no exception. We therefore suggest a three-fold 
categorisation of the interests of holders of public office: 
a) idealism, altruism of the ‘public servant’;  
b) legitimate own interests - promotion, re-election, prestige; 
c) illegitimate own interests - corruption, favouritism. 
It seems plausible to suggest that first, the promotion of renewables is driven by a 
combination of these three motives and second, where motivations of the c) category play a 
big role and become publicly known, rent management is less likely to succeed. However, 
what holders of public office can get away with varies with institutional and cultural traditions.  
Banking on getting away with it is not good enough for our purpose of identifying the critical 
success factors for rent management. We therefore need to ask whether there are ways of 
offering targeted incentives for structural change without running into problems of illegitimate 
enrichment. The traditional rent seeking literature envisages little chance of doing this and is 
                                               
8  Harmful rent seeking tends to be driven by short term interests but can also be influenced by longer term interests. 
9  Olson (1993) used the distinction between ‘roving’ and ‘stationary’ bandits for this purpose but the term ‘bandit’ implies a 
money-grabbing motive which may or may not apply. In many cases, the policy makers’ interest lies in obtaining 
promotion or re-election. Being associated with a successful policy initiative can enhance the prospects of fulfilling this 
legitimate ambition.  
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therefore against active cooperation between government and business.10 Such 
fundamentalism however was challenged by those analysts who tried to understand why the 
newly industrialising countries – in particular those in Asia - were so successful in the 
1970s/80s/90s. They found that the state played a major role in the growth and 
transformation of these economies and that close relationships with the private sector were 
critical for the effectiveness of these states (Amsden 1989; Evans 1995). These experiences 
led Schneider and Maxfield (1997) to take stock and bring about a useful shift in the research 
agenda from whether to under what conditions close relationships between policy makers 
and investors have a positive effect. On the business side, they highlight the features of the 
business association (How encompassing is it? Does it monitor and sanction the behavior of 
members?). On the government side, they highlight the features of the bureaucracy 
(meritocratic recruitment and promotion and including career incentives to engage with 
business). Then they add contextual factors conducive to forging close relationships and 
positive outcomes, notably market threats (competitive pressure) and political threats (to the 
country or the party in power).  
This identification of conducive factors is helpful for our purposes. State business relations 
characterised by formal relationships between a meritocratic bureaucracy on the one hand 
and an inclusive business association contribute to good rent management. But do we want 
to elevate this kind of state-business relation into a necessary condition for successful rent 
management? Posing this question means entering the murky world in which the benefits of 
meritocracy and transparency are recognised but not always practised and in which informal 
relationships matter more than formal relationships. It is these features which characterise a 
large part of the real world – though to different degrees.  
There are recent studies which have examined the informal and transitional relations 
between state and business and enquired into the outcomes. The relevance of such informal 
and transitional relationships comes out strongly in a study on the politics of investment and 
growth in Egypt (before the revolution). It shows that even in a country where rent seeking is 
widespread, effective public-private alliances can emerge focused on fostering the growth of 
specific sectors. Abdel-Latif and Schmitz (2011) conclude that state-business relations – 
where they are driven by common interest and informed by common understanding of 
problems – played an important role in directing private investment into a new sector and 
restructuring an old sector. Concerned with the potential for abuse, they list six factors which 
influence whether such public-private alliances have the sought after transformational effect 
or are abused for individual enrichment. While not tested in their own empirical work, these 
factors are directly relevant for our purposes.  
                                               
10  Some of it sees rent seeking as ‘pathological’ to economic development (Starr 1998; Ngo 2009). 
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Table 5.1 Public-private alliances: factors contributing to positive outcomes  
Factor Effect 
Organisational 
capacity of the 
private sector 
High organisational capacity of the private sector and broad-based 
membership of its association increases the likelihood of an 




Accountability and promotion linked to carbon emission-reducing 
performance increases the likelihood of policy makers engaging in 
low-carbon alliances with the private sector.  
Competitive pressure Abuse of public-private alliance is less likely when protection of 
internal markets is low.  
Monitoring of sectoral 
performance 
Open access to key performance indicators and regular monitoring 
reduce the likelihood of public-private alliances being abused for 
private gains.  
Consumer protection 
laws and agencies 
Consumer protection laws and consumer protection agencies 
reduce the likelihood of public-private alliances taking initiatives 
which harm the public. 
Freedom of the press A free and inquisitive press and media reduce the risk of public-
private alliances being used for personal enrichment.  
Source: Adapted from Abdel-Latif and Schmitz (2011). 
The factors identified in Table 5.1 amount to an eclectic list. It includes factors which concern 
the organisation of the private sector, the public sector, the economy (by sector), and civil 
society. None of these factors in isolation will be sufficient to make rent management 
effective: they work in conjunction. We are not saying, however, all of the factors must apply 
in order to achieve the desired outcome.  
In conclusion, the overall lessons from the state-business literature are that: 
• Some of the critical success factors lie outside the state apparatus.11 
• Transformative rent management requires alignments of interest across the public-private 
divide. 
• The abuse of such alliances for illegitimate purposes can be curtailed through a 
combination of ways involving monitoring and pressure.12  
                                               
11  In a companion piece we concentrate on critical success factors within government, notably the government capabilities 
needed for successful rent management (see Altenburg et al. 2013).  
12  The principal-agent approach to rent management comes to the same conclusion regarding the need for monitoring. It 
can be seen to provide a more direct route to understanding and improving the allocation and distribution of rents. The 
state-business literature and the focus on alliances is however more useful on the issue of creating rents and finding 
solutions to complex collective action problems – as seen later in Section 7. 
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6 Policy learning and experimentation 
Recall that the reason for rent managers seeking to work with the private sector is that they 
need to explore what to do. There is no golden pathway. There is no best instrument that 
suits all conditions. Section 3 stressed that that rent management can use a variety of 
instruments. This section asks how government acquires the capabilities to select and 
implement policies and learns from successes and failures. This is particularly relevant for 
rent management focused on new green sectors.  
The emphasis on exploring, discovering, learning and experimenting is relatively recent in 
the industrial policy literature. It has been stressed particularly forcefully by Rodrik:  
The right model for industrial policy is not that of an autonomous government applying 
Pigovian taxes or subsidies, but of strategic collaboration between the private sector 
and the government with the aim of uncovering where the most significant obstacles to 
restructuring lie and what type of interventions are most likely to remove them. 
Correspondingly, the analysis of industrial policy needs to focus not on the policy 
outcomes—which are inherently unknowable ex ante—but on getting the policy 
process right. We need to worry about how we design a setting in which private and 
public actors come together to solve problems in the productive sphere, each side 
learning about the opportunities and constraints faced by the other…Hence the right 
way of thinking of industrial policy is as a discovery process—one where firms and the 
government learn about underlying costs and opportunities and engage in strategic 
coordination. The traditional arguments against industrial policy lose much of their force 
when we view industrial policy in these terms… Yes, the government needs to maintain 
its autonomy from private interests. But it can elicit useful information from the private 
sector only when it is engaged in an ongoing relationship with it.  
(Rodrik 2007:101) 
We have quoted Rodrik at length because this perspective is highly relevant for rent 
management aimed at fostering the renewable sectors. The uncertainties are enormous and 
both government and business are engaged in a discovery process which we need to 
understand.  
There is of course international learning (from other countries) but it is not sufficient. While 
endless research and consultancy papers are written about policy lessons for or from other 
countries, the successful economic transformations in history have one thing in common: 
each country found its own way forward. This point was made a long time ago by the 
historian Alexander Gerschenkron. In his book Economic Backwardness in Historical 
Perspective (1962) he argued that latecomers have to plot their own distinctive path of 
transformation. Repeating what others have tried before is rarely possible because each 
country has its own specific internal conditions and because the rise of the early developer 
changes the external conditions for the latecomer. Analysis of early industrialisation in 
continental Europe led Gerschenkron to this conclusion. Analysis of economic transformation 
in East Asia leads to the same conclusion. Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan and China did 
not follow models from elsewhere. In ‘Institutions and Growth in East Asia’, Stephan Haggard 
(2004) emphasised how East Asia succeeded through a long process of ‘transition’ that was 
highly experimental in nature. Similarly, Mike Hobday (2003), in a review of Asian industrial 
development, concludes that it is diversity rather than uniformity in the institutional 
arrangements and development policy that characterises the innovation experience of the 
Asian Tigers.  
In short, the institutional configurations of the successful transformers varied a great deal; 
they had taken different routes and used different instruments. This does not amount to an 
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argument against learning from each other’s successes and mistakes. It is however an 
argument for starting with one’s own internal and external circumstances. This seems an 
important conclusion for the green transformation project. It provides the starting point for the 
discovery process, experimentation and policy learning stressed by Rodrik (2007).  
The question then is whether we can distinguish between different ways of organising the 
learning process. An essential distinction is that between centralised and decentralised rent 
regimes. Countries in which all or part of the rent management is delegated to sub-national 
governments have a much bigger laboratory. Good examples are Germany, India and China 
which have a history of decentralised industrial policy. Such decentralised settings offer a 
greater learning potential for three reasons: each state or province can conduct its own 
policy, competition between states/provinces accelerates the learning, and the laggards can 
learn from the advanced rent managers. Intra-country learning is easier to organise than 
inter-country learning because common framework conditions apply.  
We need, however, to take into account that there are counterarguments. Hongbin Cai and 
Triesman (2006, 2009) contradict the proposition that decentralisation enhances policy 
experimentation; their counterarguments are based on modeling work and empirical research 
in China. In contrast, Heilmann (2008) suggested that decentralisation contributes to policy 
experimentation in China. Similarly, Schmitz et al. (2012) conclude that decentralisation had 
a positive effect in Vietnam. The rapid economic transformation of Vietnam benefited from 
experimentation that went on in the provinces. The provinces were laboratories some of 
which generated insights that were used in other provinces and by the Centre. Further 
support comes from Altenburg and Engelmeier (2012) who conclude that rent management 
for solar energy in India has worked well because under the umbrella of the National Solar 
Mission there was scope for experimentation and policy learning in various Indian states. So 
there is a plausible case for distinguishing between policy learning in centralised and 
decentralised rent regimes. But for our concerns it is not sufficient to ask whether 
decentralising rent management enhances policy learning; we need to ask under what 
conditions it does so. Decentralised systems have bigger laboratories for experimentation, 
but experimentation does not guarantee policy learning. For this to happen, institutional 
arrangements are needed that assess experiments and extract policy lessons. 
To conclude, for rent management to succeed it needs to take into account that: 
• There is no golden pathway for accelerating the transition to renewable energy. Each 
country needs to find its own way forward.  
• Learning from the experiences of other countries is useful but replication rarely works. 
Starting from the country’s own conditions is paramount.  
• Experimenting is essential. Working with the private sector is important for experiments to 
succeed.  
• In decentralised political systems it is easier to organise experimentation but the 
transmission belt to policy learning needs further research.  
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7 Extra challenges for green rent 
management 
The previous sections have highlighted factors that contribute to the success of rent 
management. They apply to rent management in general - whatever sectoral shift it seeks to 
bring about. This section asks why accelerating the shift from a high to a low carbon 
economy involves extra challenges and suggests four inter-connected reasons: (1) urgency 
of action, (2) long time horizons, (3) high uncertainties, and (4) unprecedented market 
failures (Altenburg and Pegels 2012). It then discusses why a more political approach is 
needed for green rent management and why public-private-civic alliances are critical for it to 
succeed. 
7.1 Urgency 
The urgency comes from the prediction of irreversible damage. Continuing with business as 
usual has costs that are almost impossible to calculate but certainly higher than making low 
carbon investments now. Climate scientists warn us that decarbonisation has to be achieved 
within a very short time frame if severe environmental damages are to be avoided. According 
to Stern (2009), CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere need to be kept below 500 parts per 
million (ppm) if we want to maintain a 50 per cent chance of keeping global warming below 
2°C. The more we move beyond this level, the higher the risks of environmental tipping 
points beyond which self-reinforcing and largely irreversible mechanisms start off, e.g. when 
permafrost soils start thawing releasing large quantities of methane gas; when polar caps 
melt and sea water levels rise; or when the ecosystem of the Amazon's tropical rainforests 
collapses. If no action is taken, around 750 ppm will be reached by the end of the century, 
causing an increase of the global mean temperature estimated at 5°C relative to pre-
industrial levels (Stern 2009). 
In other words, the green transformation is the first transformation in human history that has 
a deadline - and a very ambitious one. To keep this deadline, bold action needs to be taken 
immediately. According to IPCC (2007), WBGU (2011) and other research groups, 
greenhouse gas emissions need to decline before 2020 if the 2°C-target is to be reached. 
However at the time of writing (late 2012), emissions continue to increase. There is 
agreement that a switch in the source of energy is an essential component of a turn around. 
Helm (2012) argues that in considering this switch too much attention is given to the choice 
between fossil fuels and renewables and not enough to the choice between different types of 
fossil fuel. ‘Getting out of coal is an absolute and immediate priority’ and gas (whose carbon 
emissions are half that of coal) can play an important transitional role (Helm 2012:10). We 
agree with this, but would stress that investing in renewable energy now is essential for 
achieving more dramatic reductions later. While scenarios for the transition towards a 
sustainable global energy regime differ (e.g. IEA 2011; WBGU 2011), they have in common 
that they see the deployment of renewable energy technology as one of the main 
contributors to emissions reductions (besides energy efficiency technologies). While fiercely 
contested by vested interests until a few years ago (Blasberg and Kohlenberg 2012), the 
margins of scientific disagreement concerning the urgency of public action have shrunk 
considerably over more recent years.  
7.2 Uncertainty 
The problem for rent management is that - in order to succeed – it needs to focus on specific 
sectors and subsectors and use specific instruments aimed at developing and deploying 
specific technologies. It is at this level that uncertainties are high. The reasons are two-fold:  
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First, there is uncertainty with regard to the right choice of technologies. Different renewable 
energy sources – from biomass to wind, solar and geothermal – need to be combined to 
achieve a reliable energy mix; also, different technologies need to be chosen for different 
purposes, e.g. solar photovoltaics may be appropriate for local supply, whereas 
concentrating solar power (CSP) plants allow for energy storage. At the same time, it is not 
clear how rapidly the costs of different technologies diminish and, therefore, what the most 
cost-effective energy mix will be in the future in any given country or location, especially if 
costs of energy distribution and storage are accounted for. In the same vein, some 
technologies may have important co-benefits that make them more attractive than others, 
such as job creation or knowledge spillovers into other industries. Overall, current market 
prices are a poor predictor of investment needs, as they cannot fully reflect important 
parameters of the energy systems of the future, such as the long-term availability of different 
energy sources or the optimal energy mix for specific future load curves. Governments thus 
have to make choices about allocating rents for the development and deployment of different 
renewable energy technologies on the basis of highly incomplete information.  
Second, all these technologies have a range of specific positive or negative implications for 
different groups of society, and therefore prompt lobbying for and against them. The 
establishment of hydropower stations, wind and solar parks, overhead transmission lines and 
other infrastructure investments often encounters local resistance. Similarly conflictive are 
the conversion of agricultural land into bio-energy plantations and plans for potentially risky 
elements of new energy systems, such as carbon-capture and storage projects. Renewable 
energy lobbyists (from industry and NGO) in contrast try to speed up such projects. What 
shape the energy transition actually takes is therefore strongly dependent on social 
acceptance, power relations, and political settlements among stakeholder groups - and these 
may change over time in unpredictable ways. Such political uncertainty obviously affects the 
government’s ability to send out credible signals, e.g. guaranteeing a schedule for grid 
expansion or a long-term tariff subsidy.  
7.3 Long time horizons 
The uncertainties are exacerbated by the long time horizons needed for new energy systems 
to become viable. Power plants that are built today are laid out for the next 30 to 40 years. 
Also, payback periods of grids and storage facilities may stretch over several decades. 
Making investment decisions today without taking long-term effects into account may 
therefore lead to lock-in effects (Unruh 2000), because large sunk costs discourage 
switching to a superior energy system in the future. Furthermore, the full benefits of today’s 
investment can only be reaped many years later. For Germany, a recent energy scenario 
calculates that the transition to a renewable energy will require additional investments until 
around 2030 when it will start generating a large and increasing surplus compared to a fossil-
nuclear energy system (FEE 2010). Such long time horizons however increase the 
uncertainty, and the risk premium, for investors. Similarly, politicians are unlikely to impose 
huge additional costs on their current electorate, even when the long-term benefits for their 
economies are clearly conceivable.  
The combination of urgency of action, high uncertainty and long time horizons presents 
policy makers with a seemingly irresolvable dilemma. Helm has given expression to this 
dilemma when he questions ‘Low Carbon Roadmaps’ and ‘Energy Roadmaps’:  
... how can anything useful be said now about the configuration of energy systems in 
40 years time? Consider how communications technology has revolutionized not only 
communications but also economies and social interactions in the last 20 years. Then 
imagine replicating such change to energy over 40 years – or a century. 
(Helm 2011: 524) 
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The danger with such arguments is that they provide ammunition for doing nothing. The 
problem is that not intervening and relying on the market produces its own failures, many 
would say even greater failures with even worse consequences. While not a researchable 
proposition, it is important to make these market failures explicit.  
7.4 Market failures 
Stern (2007) has famously declared that climate change is the result of the biggest market 
failure of all time. While the scale might indeed be unprecedented, the types of market 
failures are not new.  
• Environmental costs are not reflected in prices. This is an old problem which has now 
particularly severe consequences. Producers and consumers do not pay for the carbon 
emissions caused by their production/consumption. Hence there is no economic incentive 
for changing what they make or consume. What is new is that the damage caused has 
global rather than merely local consequences as can be seen by the increasing incidence 
of extreme weather conditions occurring simultaneously in different parts of the world. 
Attempts to deal with this by introducing a carbon price have failed as shown notably in 
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (Helm 2012).  
• Businesses fear that they cannot reap the gains from their high risk green investment. 
Again this is an old problem but of great relevance for the development of new green 
technologies. The costs and the risks for the first movers are high providing an incentive 
to wait and pounce only once others have reduced the margins of uncertainty. The result 
is underinvestment or delay in investment – even though finance capital is desperate for 
new investment opportunities. Providing policy rents is a way of countering the lack of or 
delay in investment.  
• Coordination failures slow down investment. This is also a well-known problem. It affects 
the low carbon energy transition severely because this transition has many systemic 
features. The viability of investments depends often on the timely occurrence of other 
investments. For example, off shore wind parks in Germany are currently running into 
severe financial difficulties because the required grid connections to take the electricity to 
where it is needed lag far behind. Public infrastructure investments or the provision of 
rents for private investment are needed to overcome such coordination failures.  
In sum, a triple market failure slows down the transition from fossil fuel to renewable energy. 
In principle, introducing a carbon price, either directly via a carbon tax or indirectly via 
emissions trading, would be the best way of alleviating such failures but experiments with 
this approach have failed so far. Other instruments need to be considered in particular the 
creation and allocation of substantial amounts of policy rents. Given that such rents need to 
be provided over fairly long periods and under considerable uncertainty, the incentives for 
rent seeking and the risks of political capture are large. Governments have considerable 
scope in defining how rapidly they want to internalise environmental costs; how they allocate 
subsidies between different technologies; and whether they want to provide high subsidies in 
order to gain early mover advantage or wait and support renewable energy technology only 
when other countries have driven the initially high costs down. Rent-seekers can use any of 
these strategic considerations to push for their specific interests.  
7.5 Towards a political approach to rent management 
Given these extra challenges faced by rent management for renewables are there extra 
insights that help identify the critical success factors? Our main proposition is that the 
political element occupies an even higher place than in normal rent management.  
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Much of the debate promoted by green politicians and activists has relied on the argument 
that there is a deadline for public action. Not meeting the deadline would be punished with 
ever great climate chaos and worsening living conditions for future generations. This 
scenario of doom and gloom is not working. In spite of its scientific basis, it has not 
generated the required political support.  
The work of the WGBU (German Advisory Council for Global Change) underlines the 
relevance of working on the political dimension of rent management. The clearest 
manifestation is its 2011 report World in Transition – A Social Contract for Sustainability. The 
central message of this report is that the technological potential for comprehensive 
decarbonisation is available and the policy instruments needed are widely known. ‘Now, it is 
first and foremost a political task to overcome the barriers of such a transformation, and to 
accelerate the change.’ (WGBU 2011: 1). Central to this political task - according to the 
Council - is the forging of ‘a social contract for sustainability’. What is meant here is a 
contract between the state and the citizens. ‘The contract has to bring two important new 
protagonists into the equation: the self-organised civil society and the community of scientific 
experts’ (page 8).  
The German Council has been widely criticised for its views on the political drivers of the 
transformation (for example von Weizsäcker 2011). In our view, however, the political turn of 
the Council is a move in the right direction. Our main criticism is that a state-civic nexus is 
not sufficient. Business needs to be included explicitly, thus turning attention to the role of 
state-business-civic alliances.  
7.6 Transformative alliances 
Focusing on alliances and including business in such alliances is critical for two reasons. 
First, recent political science analysis shows that alliances (or coalitions) can be effective in 
overcoming complex collective action problems (Leftwich 2009; Peiffer 2012). Second, 
including business in the analysis and formation of alliances makes a significant difference. 
Maxfield (1991: 421) stressed long ago the critical role of policy coalitions which cut across 
state and society and include business. More recently, Abdel-Latif and Schmitz (2010) have 
shown why and how state-business alliances matter for overcoming bottlenecks in industrial 
development. When it comes to the green transformation, the inclusion of business seems 
particularly important. As stressed by Newell and Paterson (2011) ‘many capitalists and state 
elites, for a range of different reasons, now have a political and financial stake in the project 
of decarbonisation’ (page 23) … ‘short or medium term transitions to a low carbon economy 
will have to be supported (financially and politically) by powerful fractions of capital with a 
stake in the success of such a project’ (page 41). 
This is a key point. There are parts of the business community which are keen to support the 
green transformation but are in fact driven by ambitions in other fields, notably securing 
energy or building a competitive new industry.13 Understanding the political dynamics behind 
green industrial policy needs to include also those interests which are not green in 
themselves but support the green cause. Effective cooperation between public and private 
actors does not require that the players support renewables for the same reasons. On the 
contrary, the chance of effective cooperation increases dramatically if players with different 
motivations (climate change, energy security, competitiveness, green jobs) are brought into 
the picture.  
The implication is that ‘building transformative alliances’ needs to be included in our list of 
critical success factors for green rent management. Building such alliances is different from 
                                               
13  Evidence for this proposition comes from on-going research projects of the German Development Institute (Low Carbon 
Innovation Policies in China, India and South Africa) and Institute of Development Studies (The Political Economy of 
Low Carbon Investment).  
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‘building consensus’ which is conventionally included amongst the capabilities needed for 
industrial policy (Altenburg 2011: 49). Consensus is unlikely in the transition from high to low 
carbon energy. Opposition from fossil-fuel related interests is likely to remain strong as they 
seek to protect their assets.14 Investments in low carbon industries can be counted in billions 
and are rising but the value of capital assets and intellectual property of the high carbon 
industry amounts to trillions of Euros.15 Low carbon rent management cannot escape from 
this fact. In this scenario, building alliances is essential for making a transformative impact. 
Harrison and Kostka (2012) show that in both China and India the state plays a role in 
building the support base for its low carbon policies through processes which they describe 
as the bundling of policies and interests.  
Resistance comes not just from business interests related to fossil fuels. In some countries 
resistance comes also from civil society protesting against infrastructure projects or 
windfarms in particular neighbourhoods (the NIMBY problem = not in my backyard); and it 
comes from parts of government that regard as incompatible achieving both financial 
sustainability (reducing indebtedness in the current financial crisis) and environmental 
sustainability. Rent management for renewables is an intensely contested political process.  
In order to maintain legitimacy for creating substantial rents, care in the allocation and 
distribution of rents is essential. This includes reviews of rent regimes. Such reviews are 
important because costs come down by margins which are hard to predict. In photovoltaic 
solar power, each doubling of installed capacity has cut the manufacturing costs of panels by 
about half, hence subsidies can be reduced. Grid parity with conventional energy is not far 
off. In other renewables it is taking longer but this can change. The need to review rent 
regimes for renewables and to acquire the technical capacity to do so is the same as for 
most other industries. However the political demands on creating, allocating and reviewing 
rents are probably higher. Acquiring and maintaining this political capacity requires 
concentrating on reducing carbon emissions while maintaining the support of other players 
who are in it for different motives.  
To conclude this section, the structural transformation required for pushing up the share of 
renewables in the energy mix cannot rely on the market alone. There is a triple market failure 
which makes it impossible to break out of the fossil-fuel lock-in. Rent management is both 
extra important but also extra difficult for three reasons: decarbonisation has a deadline, 
investments have long time horizons, and the technological uncertainties are high. The 
combination of these three elements results in the political demands for successful rent 
management being particularly high. We have argued that the deadlines for reducing carbon 
emissions have not translated into the required political support, even though the urgency 
has a strong scientific basis. We have argued that forming and maintaining transformative 
alliances between state actors, business and civil society are essential for scaling up rent 
creation to the required level and conducting reviews driven by the decarbonisation targets 
rather than vested interests. Nevertheless vested interests need to be recognised and are 
not just a source of problems; they can also be a source of strength. Precisely because rent 
management for renewables can draw on support not just from the environmental lobby but 
also from forces primarily concerned with securing energy, building a globally competitive 
industry and creating green jobs, it can succeed. This creates the political space for applying 
the more technical and economic tasks of good rent management.  
 
                                               
14  Renewable energy is on the rise, accounting for 44 per cent of the estimated 208 Gigawatts of capacity added globally 
in 2011. However, the overall share of renewables in power generation remains at only 6 per cent because of the 
existing installed capacity of conventional power plants (Moslener 2012).  
15  Emphasised by Jonathan Shopley, Managing Director of the Carbon Neutral Company, in seminar on ‘Business and 
Climate Policy’ at the Institute of Development Studies on 6 March 2012.  
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8 Conclusion 
The creation and allocation of policy rents is the heart of green industrial policy. In this paper 
we have focused on rent management aimed at developing and deploying renewable energy 
technologies. In spite of the passions evoked by this agenda, there is little focused attention 
on the critical success factors of rent management for renewables. This paper has sought to 
define what rent management is and identify the factors that are critical for it to succeed. This 
was done by bringing together concepts and distilling insights from several bodies of 
literature that are related but tend to proceed separately. This final section draws together 
the key points and highlights issues which require attention in further research.  
Whether and how the transition from fossil-based to renewable energies should be 
accelerated is a highly contested issue. In order to cut through these contestations and 
summarise the critical success factors, we start by grouping the risks of rent management 
and then sum up how these risks can be dealt with.  
Different sections of the paper have drawn attention to different risks. These risks can be 
grouped as follows:  
• Political capture by private investors and allied policy makers 
• Choice of the wrong instruments  
• Targeting the wrong sectors or technologies 
• Doing too little. 
The critical success factors for rent management can be grouped according to how these 
risks are dealt with.  
8.1 Dealing with the risk of political capture 
The rent management process can be captured by private interests and allied policy makers 
and be abused for inappropriate ends. This risk receives a lot of attention in the academic 
debate – as stressed in section 4. It is also prominent in the public debate. The Economist, 
drawing on Dieter Helm’s (2012) The Carbon Crunch, suggested that ‘the entire renewables 
sector … has become an orgy of rent seeking’ (20 October, page 81). While exaggerated, 
the risk of inappropriate rent seeking and political capture is real. We have therefore drawn 
attention to the multiple ways in which this risk can be contained. These include monitoring 
by independent research organisations, by consumer protection agencies and above all by a 
free press. Such monitoring does not just exist in principle; it has been in operation in the 
countries which have promoted renewable energy. In Germany, Denmark, Spain, UK, US 
and other countries, the media have taken an intense interest and reported in detail on costs 
and returns on investment in renewables. The ferocity of the debate and the contestation of 
the data cannot eliminate inappropriate rent seeking and political capture but we would argue 
that the risk can be contained. Add to this countervailing pressure from abroad. This is 
clearest in the case of imports of Chinese photovoltaic panels which wiped out profits of 
European and American manufacturers and contributed to substantial reductions in feed-in-
tariffs. In summary, multiple forms of monitoring and countervailing pressures are critical 
success factors for rent management.  
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8.2 Dealing with the risk of adopting the wrong instruments 
As stressed in Sections 3 and 6, rents can be allocated in a number of ways. Different 
instruments work best in different circumstances, yet consultants tend to sell best practice 
rather than best fit. The risk of using the wrong instruments can be alleviated by testing them 
in selected parts of the country. China and Vietnam have become so successful in 
transforming their economies partly because they have a long tradition of experimenting and 
testing before rolling out policies country wide. India has shown, for the case of solar power, 
that experimenting at state level, has contributed to finding the right instruments and levels of 
support (Section 6). A culture of policy learning in government and in political parties further 
contributes to reducing the risk of adopting inappropriate instruments.  
8.3 Dealing with the risk of targeting the wrong sectors or technologies 
The risk of fostering the wrong sectors is well known in industrial policy. This is the old 
debate over whether governments can and should pick winners. History tells us that the most 
successful economies have prioritised sectors. Yes, they made mistakes in the process but 
making mistakes is unavoidable. It is hard to see how the green transformation can be 
achieved without making choices of priority sectors and technologies. In fact, choices have 
been made and some are controversial. For example, von Braun and Pachauri (2006) argue 
that fostering bio-fuels has turned out to be bad for the environment and for poor people; and 
Helm (2012) questions the importance given to off-shore wind power given its high cost. 
History will probably give a highly differentiated verdict and indicate how mistakes could have 
been avoided. But decisions need to be made now. Such decisions in favour of particular 
sectors need to include benchmarks or criteria for continuing or ending public support. As 
stressed by Rodrik (2007), the way forward is not to minimise the chance that a mistake 
might occur but to minimise the costs of mistakes when they do occur. 
8.4 Dealing with the risk of doing too little 
The most fundamental risk for the green transformation is that governments do too little and 
that the scaling up of investment is not achieved. Since the rent creation needed for such 
scaling up is politically contested we have suggested that the list of critical success factors 
include a supportive political coalition of actors. Section 7 stressed the need to build 
government-business alliances. On the one hand this is hard to achieve because public and 
private investors in fossil-based energy seek to protect their assets and undermine the case 
for renewables with any means at their disposal (Blasberg and Kohlenberg 2012). On the 
other hand, the formation of an alliance for renewables benefits from being able to mobilise 
actors with different motivations, ranging from mitigating climate change, to securing energy 
for the nation, building competitiveness in green sectors and generating new jobs.  
Creating the political space for rent management also needs to include civil society. While 
the creation of rents is expected to provide considerable opportunities, in the short term it is 
above all the costs that are visible and need to be paid for. This requires involving civil 
society in building a narrative which is credible and legitimises the costs. In sum, building a 
government-business-civic alliance supporting the transition to renewables is essential for 
successful rent management, in particular for the process of creating rents and then 
maintaining the political space for rent allocation prioritising green objectives. Relegating the 
fostering of public-private-civic alliances to the sphere of ‘politics’ and concentrating only on 
technical and economic tasks is not useful if one seeks to identify the critical success factors 
for rent management. 
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8.5 Future research 
Having set out the terrain for future research on green industrial policy, we conclude by 
indicating where further digging is needed and how deeper insights can be gained. The most 
important step is to unpack the notion of the transformational alliance, both the 
transformation and the alliance bit. The green transformation is not one big project but a 
complex process. WGBU (2011) – drawing on the work of the historian Osterhammel – 
depicts transformative processes as a concurrence of multiple changes which can occur at a 
steady or unsteady pace. Concerned with finding a way through such complexity, we would 
suggest focusing on actual or potential turning points and then asking who was driving the 
process at those turning points. In the case of China, for example, one can argue that the 
Renewable Energy Law of 2006 was such a turning point.  
This then would provide a much needed focus for studying the role of alliances. Putting such 
alliances centre stage is not sufficient. We need to be able to distinguish between alliances 
of different types. At one end there is the strategic alliance based on joint action. At the other 
end there is the mere alignment of interest without co-ordination between the parties. Both 
can be transitional (short term) or enduring (long term). Actor constellations change over time 
and differ between projects and policies. Different episodes of the transformation might be 
supported or opposed by differently composed alliances.  
The urgency of the green transformation commands that some questions are prioritised over 
others. One of the main questions is where the alliances come from. Are they accidental 
alignments of interest or are they consciously constructed and orchestrated? If the latter, who 
has the convening power? The state is the most likely candidate but our earlier analysis 
stressed that interests within the state might diverge. The key strength, but also the main 
difficulty, of the alliance approach lies in unpacking public, private and civic sectors and 
tracing alliances across these categories. If there are actors that have the convening power, 
one would want to find out what or who prompted them to act and how they go about forging 
their alliances. Such research would make a difference in that it would help us understand 
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